Zimbabwe Wants the World’s Money But Hasn’t Earned the World’s Trust

The IMF has signed off on another review. Harare is celebrating the wrong number.

Zimbabwe wants back into the international financial system, and on 7 October it took another step towards that goal. The International Monetary Fund approved the second review of the country’s 10-month Staff-Monitored Programme, giving the government another piece of evidence that it can follow an agreed economic reform plan.

Expect the government to treat it as a victory. It is progress, but the distinction matters. The programme is a non-financing arrangement. IMF staff monitor the government’s policies and performance; the programme itself does not provide Zimbabwe with a loan.

Its value lies in the track record it builds, which Zimbabwe needs as it pursues arrears clearance, debt resolution and eventual access to outside finance. That record has to be convincing because the country’s history is not reassuring. Default, currency collapse and abandoned reforms are among the reasons creditors remain sceptical. A few encouraging quarters do not erase them.

The headline numbers are encouraging, and the government will understandably lean on them. The IMF says Zimbabwe met all quantitative targets and structural benchmarks through June 2026. Economic growth is projected at 5 percent this year, while annual inflation measured in ZiG was 3.7 percent in September. The exchange rate has remained broadly stable, helped by strong mineral exports, favourable commodity prices and resilient remittance inflows.

Credit where it is due. After years of price chaos, that is real progress. Stability matters to businesses trying to plan, households trying to budget and a government trying to restore confidence in its currency.

But the government is celebrating the wrong number.

The programme’s one missed indicative target was the floor on protected social and priority spending. The IMF attributed the shortfall to persistent implementation bottlenecks, meaning that budgeted support for key programmes was not executed as intended.

Zimbabwe met its targets for fiscal discipline, but missed the spending target intended to protect vulnerable people. That is not a footnote to the recovery. It is part of the recovery itself.

Collecting revenue and holding the line on spending are important parts of a reform programme. But getting money to vulnerable households and essential services on time is just as important. A government can improve its accounts on paper while people who depend on public support continue waiting for the services and assistance that were supposed to be funded.

A government that meets its fiscal targets but misses the floor for protected social spending has a problem that cannot be explained away by a favourable inflation figure. The IMF itself has stressed the need to improve budget execution so that the gains from stabilisation reach vulnerable groups.

Low inflation and economic growth do not automatically translate into security for households. The figures can improve while wages remain inadequate, clinics struggle to provide essential services and schools operate under financial pressure. Whether that is happening in each case requires evidence, but the principle is straightforward: macroeconomic stability is a means to an end, not the end itself.

Stabilisation is not the same as security, and Zimbabweans have earned the right to be unimpressed by one without the other.

Credibility is built in dull places. It is built when expenditure follows the approved budget, when public liabilities are disclosed and when financial statements are published. It is built when the government can explain where money was allocated, what was actually spent and why important programmes fell short.

The IMF has pressed for stronger public financial management and greater transparency, including the publication of audited financial statements for state-owned enterprises and stronger oversight of the Mutapa Investment Fund and its subsidiaries. These are not peripheral housekeeping matters. Weak oversight of public entities can create financial risks that eventually land on the government’s books, while opaque accounts make it harder for citizens and creditors to know the true state of public finances.

A state that asks the world to believe in its management while keeping important books closed is asking for faith. Creditors do not lend on faith, and citizens should not be expected to govern their expectations by it either.

The real test is still ahead. Every government can keep its promises while keeping them is relatively cheap. What separates a credible government from one that merely performs credibility is what happens when discipline collides with political convenience: during an election cycle, a succession fight or a bad harvest.

Zimbabwe has never lacked recovery plans or ambitious targets. The problem has been sustaining reforms and turning promises into routine government practice. A track record built to unlock financing would be worth little if it were abandoned once the money arrived, or if the pursuit of creditor confidence came at the expense of the people whose patience makes reform politically possible.

The government has two audiences and one job. It must convince creditors that it will honour its commitments, and convince Zimbabweans that the discipline is producing tangible benefits at home.

If it manages only the first, the reforms will be harder to sustain. A public that sees no benefit from economic discipline has little reason to defend it when the next difficult decision arrives.

This review is a step forward. It is not a debt deal, a guarantee of new money or proof that ordinary Zimbabweans are better off. The IMF has approved a review of policy implementation, not declared the country’s economic problems solved.

Zimbabwe wants the world’s money. First, it must show the world, and its own citizens, that its promises will outlast the applause.